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Abstract 
Default logic encounters some conceptual dif­
ficulties in representing common sense rea­
soning tasks. We argue that we should not 
try to formulate modular default rules that 
are presumed to work in all or most circum­
stances. We need to take into account the im­
portance of the context which is continuously 
evolving during the reasoning process. Se­
quential thresholding is a quantitative coun­
terpart of default logic which makes explicit 
the role context plays in the construction 
of a non-monotonic extension. We present 
a semantic characterization of generic non­
monotonic reasoning, as well as the instan­
tiations pertaining to default logic and se­
quential thresholding. This provides a link 
between the two mechanisms as well as a way 
to integrate the two that can be beneficial to 
both. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Non-monotonic reasoning models the intuitive pro­
cess of making non-deductive inferences in the face 
of certain supportive but not conclusive evidence. 
Default logic [Reiter, 1980] is one of the most well 
known formalisms of non-monotonic reasoning. Al­
though default logic has many attractive features, it 
also encounters some conceptual difficulties in repre­
senting common sense reasoning tasks. In some cases, 
the most "intuitive" and direct formulation of a sce­
nario can lead to unexpected interactions and unin­
tended extensions, and we need to revise the formu­
lation to some less intuitive form in order to arrive 
at the intended results. A number of variants of de­
fault logic have been proposed to circumvent some 
of these difficulties encountered by Reiter's default 
logic, but they too in some cases produce counter-
intuitive results [Lukaszewicz, 1988; Brewka, 1991; 
Gelfand et al., 1991; Delgrande et al., 1994; Mikitiuk 
and Truszczynski, 1995]. 
Most of these approaches downplay an important as­
pect: that each reasoning step is not done in isola­
tion. One implicit assumption of default logic and 
its variants seems to be that default reasoning can be 
characterized using simple rules that work equally well 
across all typical situations. A brute force method to 
deal with the unintuitive use of a default rule in some 
particular situation is to add a condition to the justi­
fication list to explicitly block the rule when that sit­
uation arises. This was first suggested in [Reiter and 
Criscuolo, 1981], where the use of semi-normal default 
rules instead of normal default rules was introduced. 
We argue that we should not hope to write down de­
fault rules that are both simple and intuitive across 
many situations. A rule that appears to be intuitive 
and straightforward at first sight may have side effects 
and unintended applications in some circumstances. 
We need to take into account the context that is con­
tinuously evolving when we reason non-monotonically. 
After we have accepted a default conclusion, we take 
that conclusion as true, and it becomes part of the con­
text with respect to which we evaluate the remaining 
default rules. Thus the context consists of the state­
ments we take as true at the moment: the initial set 
of given "facts" F, plus the consequents of the default 
rules that have been applied up to this point. 
Another way to handle the problem is to appeal to 
some external source of information not communicated 
in the default rules, such as using inheritance or prior­
ity hierarchies to prefer more specific or higher priority 
default rules [Touretzky, 1984; Harty et al., 1987], and 
the utilization of probability theory for determining ac­
ceptable default rules [Pearl, 1989; Neufeld et al., 1990; 
Bacchus et al., 1993]. Our approach of sequential 
thresholding also makes use of probability, in a way 
closer to the spirit of non-monotonic reasoning and in 
particular default logic. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec­
tion 2 outlines the distinction between non-monotonic 
reasoning and Bayesian based probabilistic reasoning. 
Section 3 gives a brief summary of default logic, and 
discusses some of its conceptual difficulties and how 
they are related to the evolving context that is not ac­
cessible to the default logic mechanism. Section 4 in­
troduces a probabilistic non-monotonic reasoning for­
malism we call sequential thresholding, and Section 5 
provides a semantic account of non-monotonic reason­
ing in general and default logic and sequential thresh­
olding in particular. Section 6 discusses how the two 
mechanisms can benefit from each other, and Section 7 
concludes the discussion. 
2 NON-MONOTONIC DEFAULTS, 
MONOTONIC PROBABILITIES 
As pointed out in [Kyburg, 1996], there is a distinc­
tion between uncertain inferences and uncertain con­
clusions. In the former, the inference mechanism is 
uncertain, but the conclusions thus obtained are re­
garded as perfectly certain. There may be multiple 
extensions, each of which representing a possible sce­
nario, but within each extension there is no question 
about the "truth" of the inferred conclusions. We may 
need to retract such conclusions in the face of new in­
formation, hence the non-monotonicity. Default logic 
and many other logical formalisms such as autoepis­
temic logic [Moore, 1985] and circumscription [Mc­
Carthy, 1980] fall into this category. 
On the other hand, most of the probabilistic com­
munity falls into the latter category. The rules of 
probability employed, such as Bayes' rule, are per­
fectly deductive, and it is the conclusions, of the form 
Pr(x) = r, which convey the uncertainty. New in­
formation does not invalidate the previous probability 
calculations, since the original probability values are 
conditioned on a string of events without the new piece 
of information, while with the update, we are condi­
tioning on an additional piece of information. The 
two probability distributions are distinct as they are 
conditioned on distinct sets of events. Therefore such 
probability mechanisms are not non-monotonic. 
An exception to this monotonic probabilistic trend 
is Kyburg's probabilistic acceptance [Kyburg, 1961], 
which advocates accepting the conclusions fully when 
their probabilities are deemed high enough. The work 
described in this paper is along the same lines. We 
focus on default logic as a concrete example of non­
monotonic reasoning formalisms, and discuss how a 
link between default logic and probability can be ben­
eficial to both. Below let us briefly summarize the 
preliminary terminology of default logic. 
3 DEFAULT LOGIC [Reiter, 1980] 
Let £ be a standard propositional language, and P 
be the finite set of propositional constants in £. We 
denote the provability operator by f-, and for any S s;; 
£,we have Th(S):::::: {¢:Sf-¢}. 
Definition 1 A default rule is an expression 
O<:M§1� .. ,M/3n, where n:,{31, . . . ,(3n, ryE C. We call 
n: the prerequisite, {31, . .. , /3n the justifications, and 1 
the consequent of the default rule. A default rule is 
normal if it is of the form a::�1, and semi-normal if 
it is of the form a::�f"7. A default theory � is an 
ordered pair (D, F), where D is a set of default rules 
and F (facts) s;; £. 
Loosely speaking, a default rule a::Mi3t�· ,Mf3, repre­
sents that if n: is provable, and -,j31, ... , '/3n is each 
not provable, then we by default assert that 7 is true. 
For a default theory � = (D, F), the known facts con­
stitute F, and a theory extended from F by applying 
the default rules in D is known as an extension of �. 
defined as follows. 
Definition 2 Let � = (D, F) be a default theory 
over C, and E s;; C. f(E) is the smallest set satis­
fying the following three properties. [ 1 j F s;; r( E), 
{2] f(E) = Th(r(E)), and {3] for every default 
rule a::M§t� .. ,M§n E D, if (a) a E f(E), and (b) 
•/31 , ... , •/3n � E, then 1 E r( E). E is an extension 
of� iff Eis a fixed point of r, that is, E:::: f(E). 
3.1 CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES 
At first glance, a default rule is very easy to under­
stand: if the prerequisite is true, and each of the jus­
tifications is possible, then infer by default the con­
sequent. Reiter first argued [Reiter, 1980] that nor­
mal defaults are expressive enough for most common 
sense applications. However, on closer inspection, de­
fault rules that appear intuitively reasonable in isola­
tion can give rise to unintuitive results when taken to­
gether [Reiter and Criscuolo, 1981; Lukaszewicz, 1985; 
Poole, 1989]. The facts and default rules may inter­
act in unexpected ways, and result in no extension or 
unwanted multiple extensions. 
We argue that this problem is to be expected in the 
default logic framework. Consider the following canon­
ical normal default theory. 
Example 3 Ll- (D F) where D- {a:Mb a':M�b} .,. ' b ., --.b ' 
and F = {a, a'} . There are two extensions, E1 == 
Th({a,a',b}), and E2 == Th({a,a',-.b}). 
Which extension is better? Should we get rid of one, 
or should we keep both? Let us consider the following 
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popular instantiations. 
• a: bird, a' :penguin, b: fly, we want only E2. 
• a: bird, a' : animal, b : fly, we want only E1. 
• a : quaker, a' : republican, b : pacifist, then 
we want to treat E1 and E2 equally. 
The three instantiations are propositionally identical. 
Given the same default theory, we cannot expect the 
mechanism to generate different results. It is quite 
obvious that we, the "intelligent beings", are in pos­
session of some contextual information that leads us to 
want to draw different conclusions in the different ex­
amples. However, this additional information, which 
underlies our "intuition" in choosing between the ex­
tensions, is not available to the default theory as it is 
formulated above. The theory is indifferent to whether 
a1 is supposed to stand for penguin or animal. Nor 
does it know that penguins are animals either. 0 
This problem motivates semi-normal defaults [Reiter 
and Criscuolo, 1981], where an extra justification is 
used to denote "non-exceptions", so that the rule can 
only be applied when the object in question is not a 
known exception. For example, the default rules in 
the first case discussed above would be amended as 
follows. 
{
bird: M-.penguin 1\ fly penguin: M-.fly
} 
fly ' -.fly 
where the term -.penguin is added to the justification 
to prevent the rule from firing when the bird in ques­
tion is a penguin. 
This amended rule works fine in this case, but there 
are many other exceptions to the "birds typically fly" 
rule. This leads to a qualification problem, where we 
need to have a longer and longer (3 in the justification 
part in order to cover all "unintuitive" cases. This 
seems to defeat the purpose of doing non-monotonic 
reasoning in the first place: we can as well explicitly 
list all exceptions, and revert to deductive inferences 
instead, which is not desirable even if feasible. "Nam­
ing defaults" [Poole, 1987) also has a similar problem. 
3.2 MISSING CONTEXT 
We argue that this "intuition problem" arises because 
we are misled into thinking that we can formulate de­
fault rules that are modular. By that we mean the 
default rules are expected to "do the right thing" re­
gardless of what else is present in the environment. For 
example, the rule "birds typically fly" should fire when 
we only know that Tweety is a bird, but the same rule 
should not fire when we know in addition that Tweety 
is a penguin. The incorporation of exceptions into the 
justification is an attempt to encode some of this con­
textual information into the rule itself, but this makes 
the rules very cumbersome and difficult to formulate. 
A much simpler approach is to take default rules as just 
one component of a non-monotonic reasoning system. 
We evaluate each default rule with respect to a con­
textual element which is encoded in some way external 
to the rule itself. An example of this approach is the 
use of inheritance and priority hierarchies [Touretzky, 
1984; Horty et al., 1987] to determine the more spe­
cific or higher priority extension (s ). For example, from 
the inheritance hierarchy we know that penguins are a 
subclass of birds, and the more specific rule concerning 
penguins is given priority over the more general rule 
concerning birds. 
However, it is not always straightforward to establish 
a specificity hierarchy, especially when the classes con­
cerned do not have a strict set inclusion relation. For 
example, consider a world in which not all penguins 
are birds, that is, penguins are typically birds, but 
there are some exceptions. It is then not obvious on 
what basis we can claim that penguins are more spe­
cific than birds.1 
3.3 DYNAMICS OF THE CONTEXT 
We pointed out that a default rule has to be evaluated 
relative to the context it is situated in. Now we also 
want to stress that this context is not a constant even 
if we only consider a single situation requiring default 
reasoning. Rather, the context is continuously evolv­
ing during the course of the reasoning process, as we 
draw more and more default conclusions. 
One property that is present in many non-monotonic 
reasoning systems is that we can build upon the non­
monotonic conclusions drawn earlier to draw yet more 
non-monotonic conclusions. In default logic this cor­
responds to the chaining of default rules. Every time a 
default rule is applied, the consequent 'Y of that rule is 
added as part of the context available to the remain­
ing rules, and 'Y acquires virtually the same status as 
the statements in the original given set of facts F of 
the default theory in subsequent computations. The 
default consequent of one rule can act as the prerequi­
site of another rule, and the latter rule is dependent on 
the former to create the favorable conditions for itself. 
Thus, even within one reasoning episode, the relevant 
1 Of course all penguins are birds, but consider replacing 
"birds", "fly", and "penguins" with "adults", "employed", 
and "university students" [Reiter and Criscuolo, 1981], and 
we would need to show that "university students" are more 
specific than "adults" , a dubious assertion. 
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context is not a static component; rather each default 
rule operates within a different context. 
One way to make this evolving context available to 
the reasoning machinery without explicitly and ex­
haustively listing all possibilities and conditions is to 
appeal to probability and the conditioning operation. 
Below we show a quantitative counterpart of default 
logic that retains its non-monotonic characteristic. 
4 SEQUENTIAL THRESHOLDING 
Now we present a probabilistic reasoning mechanism 
that is non-monotonic and very close in flavor to de­
fault logic. Sequential thresholding can be classified as 
a kind of probabilistic acceptance [Kyburg, 1961]. We 
accept a statement as true when its associated prob­
ability is high, say, above a certain threshold. The 
novelty here is that the thresholding is done sequen­
tially, that is, each statement is considered in turn, and 
all accepted statements participate in the conditioning 
of subsequent statements in determining whether they 
are above threshold. 
The thresholding process can be thought of as a form of 
generalized conditioning. In regular conditioning, the 
conditional probability Pr(� I ¢) is computed when 
Pr( ¢) is assumed to have changed to 1. Thresholding 
imposes a weaker requirement: given a threshold pa­
rameter e, accept ¢if Pr(¢) 2:: 1- e, and adjust the 
posterior probabilities of all statements as if they are 
conditioned on ¢. 2 
More formally, we have the following definition. 
Definition 4 A threshold collection C is an ordered 
pair (T, F), where T and F � £. We call T the thresh­
old set and F the fact set. 
A filtered sequence 11 of C = (T, F) with respect to 
the sequential threshold parameter e is a sequence 
(¢1, ... ,¢n), such that {1} V¢i in 11: ¢i E T and 
Pr(¢i IF U {¢1, ... ,<f>;-d) � 1- e, and {2] V¢ E T 
but not in 11, Pr(¢ I F U { ¢1, ... , ¢n}) < 1 -e. 
Pr<l> ( 1/J), the threshold probability of� with respect to 
a filtered sequence 11 = {¢1, ... , ¢n) of C, is defined as 
Pr<�> ( 1/J) = Pr( � I F u { <f>1, . . . , <Pn}). 
The filtered sequence 11 contains the formulas that we 
accept as true using the sequential thresholding pro­
cess. The threshold probability Pr<�> ( 1/J) is the probabil­
ity value of interest: the probability of 1j; conditioned 
on the facts F and all the formulas in the filtered se­
quence, which are the formulas we have decided to 
2The t: in the threshold does not tend to 0 in the limit, as 
in .:-semantics [Adams, 1975; Pearl, 1989], but is assumed 
to be some small quantity. 
accept. 
The formulas in the fact set F do not need to be above 
threshold to enter into the computation of the thresh­
old probability. The formulas in the threshold set T, 
however, have to pass a threshold test in order to be 
included in the filtered sequence 11. 
The value compared in the threshold test is the prob­
ability of ¢; conditioned on the facts F and all the 
formulas that have been entered into the filtered se­
quence before (h This sequence is maximal, in the 
sense that no other formula in T that is not already 
in 11 can be appended to the end of the sequence in 
accordance to the threshold test. 
Note that the effective probability space is shrinking. 
If Pr(¢l1 I F) is above threshold, we then only con­
sider the space in which F and ¢1 are true in sub­
sequent tests, and the probability distribution of in­
terest becomes Pr( * I F U { <f>t}), which becomes 
Pr( * I FU{ ¢1 , ¢2, ... <f>k}) as more formulas are admit­
ted into the filtered sequence. The probability value 
associated with a formula is technically unchanging: 
for example Pr( � I F U {<flo, ¢1}) is invariant through­
out. Rather it is the "context" in which to compute 
the target probability value of 1/J that is continuously 
evolving, as we build the filtered sequence. 
Note also the sequential nature of how the thresh­
old test is administered. Since in general Pr(1/l I 
¢o, . .. , ¢Jk) i- Pr('I/J lr/>o, ... , ¢lk1 ¢k+t), a formula that 
is below threshold at one point might become eligible 
for thresholding after we have taken a few other for­
mulas as true, and a formula that is above threshold 
at one point may not be so after we have thresholded 
some other formulas. In this sense, sequential thresh­
olding is non-monotonic; we commit to the truth of 
certain formulas when they become above threshold, 
and the probability distribution of interest is changed 
accordingly. 
5 DRAWING A PARALLEL 
In this section, we characterize a generic non­
monotonic reasoning mechanism in terms of the con­
text that evolves as the computation progresses. This 
generic process can be instantiated in various ways to 
characterize various specific reasoning formalisms, in 
particular, default logic and sequential thresholding, 
thus providing a link between the two. 
Informally, a non-monotonic reasoning step can be de­
picted generically as follows. 
1. Find a non-monotonic rule that is applicable in 
the current context. 
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2. Apply the rule, and accept its non-monotonic con­
clusion as true. 
3. Extend the context to reflect the addition of the 
newly inferred conclusion. 
After one cycle we find another rule that is applicable 
in the extended context, apply this rule, and add its 
non-monotonic conclusion to the new context, and the 
process repeats ... 
Both default logic and sequential thresholding conform 
to this characterization. For simplicity, in the case of 
default logic, we give the instantiation for normal de­
fault theories only. Non-normal default theories re­
quire some additional consideration, but the results 
basically hold for the general case as well [Teng, 1997]. 
Normal default theories have essentially the same 
structure as sequential thresholding. This can best be 
shown semantically by looking at the possible world 
partition sequences [Teng, 1996] of the generic non­
monotonic reasoning mechanism described above, and 
of its instantiations for these two specific formalisms. 
5.1 GENERIC NON-MONOTONIC 
PARTITION SEQUENCES 
A possible world is characterized by a truth assignment 
to all propositions in the language, and a real number 
weight. Given an exhaustive set of possible worlds 
W, a partition sequence of W is a tuple (W0, • • •  , W1), 
l � 1, where the non-empty sets W; in the sequence 
form a partition3 of W. 
Definition 5 A generic non-monotonic reasoning 
partition sequence can be characterized by the process 
Partitionw(B,R), as follows. 
Input An exhaustive set of possible worlds W, a set of 
background facts B, a set of non-monotonic rules 
R, each of the form r = (cond; res), where cond 
is the condition under which the rule r can be 
applied, and res is the non-monotonic conclusion 
to be inferred if r is indeed applied. 
Output A partition sequence (W0, • • •  , W1) depicting 
the non-monotonic reasoning process. 
Process 
W0: Initialization Wo contains all the worlds in 
which the set of background facts B is false. 
W;: Non-monotonic Step For each W;, 0 < 
i < l ,  find a non-monotonic rule r = 
(cond; res) E R such that 
3 A partition of a set S is a set of non-empty sets 
sl, ... 'Sn, such that U; S; = s, and S; n Sj = 0 fori =I= j. 
Applicability cond is satisfied in the con­
text (W;, ... , Wz). 
Context Expansion All the worlds in 
which res is false are grouped into W;. 
The revised context of reference becomes 
(W;+l, ... , WI). 
W1: Closure Every rule in R whose cond is sat­
isfied in the context (WI) has been applied. 
Given a set of facts B and a set of non-monotonic 
rules R, Parti tionw (B, R) describes one way of how 
a partition sequence characterizing the reasoning with 
respect to B and R progresses. Each reasoning step 
is performed with respect to a context (W;, . .. , Wz), 
which represents the body of information taken as true 
at the moment. The partition sequence can be seen 
as recording the change in this context as we draw 
more and more non-monotonic conclusions. The con­
text evolves, starting at (W0, ... , Wz), and changing 
to (W1, .. . , Wz), . . . , (W;, . . .  , Wl), ... , until we reach 
(W1). Successive contexts differ by one formula res, 
which is the non-monotonic conclusion of the rule most 
recently applied. 
Note that some of the Wi'S may be empty. For exam­
ple, in the initialization step, if B is empty, then Wo is 
empty. The last class W1 in the partition sequence is of 
particular interest. It is the "end-state" of the reason­
ing process. In default logic, W1 represents a default 
extension, and in sequential thresholding, this corre­
sponds to the thresholded population. Also note that 
Partitionw(B, R) is not a function; there can be more 
than one partition sequence that can be constructed 
from the same initial parameters, such as when there 
are multiple extensions. 
5.2 INSTANTIATIONS 
Now we give the instantiations for normal default the­
ory and sequential thresholding respectively. We bor­
row the notation of modal logic: Da is taken to mean 
a is true in all worlds, O"f is taken to mean 1 is true in 
some world, both with respect to the reference context 
(W;, ... , W1} in the following. 
Theorem 6 Given a normal default theory .6. = 
(D, F), a default partition sequence can be constructed 
by Partitionw(F,R), where 
a·M1 
R = { (Da 1\ O"f; "/) : . E D}. 
I 
E is an extension of .6. iff there is a default partition 
sequence (Wo, ... , Wl) such that E is the set of sen­
tences true in all the worlds in wl. 
In the following, let%(¢) denote the weighted propor­
tion of worlds in which ¢ is true among the worlds in 
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the context (W;, ... , W1). 
Theorem 7 Given a threshold collection C 
= 
(T, F) and a threshold parameter t, a sequential 
threshold partition sequence can be constructed by 
Parti tionw (F, R), where 
R={(%(¢)�1-t; ¢}:¢ET}. 
ci> == (¢1, ... , ¢1-I) is a filtered sequence of C at t 
iff there is a sequential threshold partition sequence 
(Wo, ... , W1/ such that r; = (%(¢;) � 1- E; ¢;) is the 
rule used at step i. The threshold probability Pr <:» ( �) 
is the weighted proportion of worlds in which 1/J is true 
in "Wi. 
The partition sequences for normal default theories 
and sequential thresholding sport very similar condi­
tions. The set of facts used to construct W0 is given 
by a fact set F in both formalisms. In normal de­
fault theory, a default rule 0'�1 can be applied when 
o: is true and "Y is possible in the current context of 
(W;, ... , Wz). After this rule is applied, we take "Y as 
true, and exclude all those worlds in which "Y is false 
when we construct the revised context (W;+l, ... , W1 ) .  
Similarly in  sequential thresholding, ¢; E T is ap­
pended to the filtered sequence when the proportion 
of worlds in which ¢; is true among those in the cur­
rent context (W;, ... , WI) is above threshold. After we 
have thresholded ¢;,we take¢; to be true, and exclude 
all those worlds in which ¢; is false when we construct 
the revised context (WH1, .. . , W!)-
For default logic, the last class W1 determines what for­
mulas are present in that particular extension, while 
for sequential thresholding, wl represents the formu­
las we have accepted (the filtered sequence) and the 
threshold probabilities with respect to these formulas. 
6 SYMBIOSIS 
Given the similarities regarding the structures of de­
fault logic and sequential thresholding, we can com­
bine them easily into a hybrid formalism that makes 
use of non-monotonic rules whose applicability condi­
tions involve both default logic style and probabilistic 
threshold style components. In this section we discuss 
how each formalism can benefit from the other in a 
hybrid arrangement. 
6.1 FINDING THE GOOD EXTENSIONS 
We saw that unlike many other probabilistic for­
malisms, sequential thresholding is non-monotonic, in 
that previously thresholded formulas can enter into 
subsequent computations as ( defeasibly) true and not 
just highly probable statements. 
The similarity in structure of sequential thresholding 
and default logic provides a link from "intuition" to 
probabilistically grounded rules, with respect to the 
specific context a default rule faces when it is applied 
during the reasoning process. This can be used to 
establish a context-sensitive metric for evaluating the 
relative "goodness" of multiple extensions, a situation 
often encountered in default logic. 
An extension is constructed from a default theory � = 
{D, F) by starting with the set of facts F, and applying 
a sequence of default rules (d1, ... , d1_1) successively. 
Let each default rule be normal and of the form d; = 
a:;:�'"fi. The same partition sequence corresponding 
to this default extension can be achieved by sequential 
thresholding, using F as the fact set and { -y1 , ... , 11-1} 
as the filtered sequence, with respect to some € large 
enough so that all the 1's can be above threshold. 
There can be various ways to define a goodness mea­
sure of an extension as a function of this t: value. For 
example, one way is to take the minimum value fmin 
that would yield the extension in question. The se­
quential threshold 1 - Emin measures how probable the 
most improbable (in the sequential context) default 
consequent is among those of the default rules used in 
constructing the particular extension. We can consider 
an extension "better" than another if its associated 
minimum threshold parameter Emin is smaller. 
In contrast to other works relating default logic to 
probability, such as [Pearl, 1989; Neufeld et al., 1990; 
Goldszmidt et al., 1990; Bacchus et al., 1993], sequen­
tial thresholding retains the non-monotonic nature of 
default logic. This gives a fairer measure of the good­
ness of an extension, since it obeys a fundamental 
principle motivating default logic. In particular, both 
default logic and sequential thresholding rely on the 
evolving context resulting from the non-monotonic ac­
ceptance of conclusions. 
6.2 WHAT'S IN IT FOR 
THRESHOLDING? 
Some may argue the main strength of default logic over 
probabilistic approaches is that we can avoid having to 
come up with messy numbers. Why, one would then 
ask, do we need to have default rules at all when we 
have the probabilities? 
People are not good at assigning numeric values to 
propositions. This difficulty alone provides a good in­
centive for seeking out formalisms that either do not 
make use of numeric information, or if they do, are not 
sensitive to perturbations in the numbers assigned. Se­
quential thresholding by itself is very sensitive to the 
value of the threshold parameter t: [Teng, 1996], and 
thus it makes more sense to use it as a companion 
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mechanism for ranking default extensions rather than 
using it as a standalone reasoning mechanism. We are 
not as dependent on the actual numbers assigned when 
we only need to use them as a way to determine the 
relative goodness of the extensions. 
Another problem of thresholding concerns the compo­
sition of the threshold set T, which contains the formu­
las we will attempt to threshold. Sequential threshold­
ing does not deal with how we come up with this set. 
However, there is no reason to assume that we should 
threshold exhaustively until there are no more formu­
las above threshold (except tautologies), nor that it 
suffices to try arbitrary formulas. Until we have a reli­
able way of automatically generating candidates of "in­
teresting and relevant" formulas, we need some mecha­
nism for directing the thresholding process to focus on 
the formulas of our choice. Logical contraptions such 
as default logic provide a concise and well defined tool 
for expressing preferences in choosing the next formula 
to threshold. 
6.3 EXAMPLE 
An extended example is not possible here due to space 
limitation, but we will reuse the canonical Example 3 
to give a sense of how the different formalisms com­
pare. 
A partition sequence corresponding to E1 is 51 = 
(Wa, Wb, We), where 
Wa { {...,a, ...,a', -,b}, {-,a, -,a', b }, {-,a, a', ..,b}, 
{-,a, a', b}, {a, ..,a', -,b}, {a, ..,a', b} }, 
wb { {a, a'  -,b}}' 
We {{a,a',b}}. 
A partition sequence corresponding to E2 is 52 = 
(Wa, We, Wb)· 
In sequential threshold terms, we have a threshold col­
lection (T,F), where T = {b,-,b}, and F = {a,a'}. 
The partition sequence 51 characterizes the sequen­
tial thresholding process with respect to the filtered 
sequence (b), while s2 can be generated with the fil­
tered sequence (-.b). The minimum f that would yield 
51 is the weighted proportion of worlds in Wb among 
those in both Wb u We. The minimum f for 52 is the 
weighted proportion of We with respect to Wb u We. 
Now consider the instantiation a: bird, a' : penguin, 
b: fly. We know that flying penguins are quite rare, 
but how rare? The constraints on the magnitude of 
the weights assigned to the worlds in order to make 
E2 more favorable than Et is very loose: we just need 
to make sure that the weight of {a, a', b} (flying pen­
guins) is smaller than the weight of {a, a', -,b} (non­
flying penguins). This will ensure that the minimum 
e required for s2 is smaller than that for sl. 
It is very obvious in this toy example that the weights 
of the two worlds in question should differ greatly. 
However, in more complicated situations, we may only 
have a vague idea of the distribution of weights, and 
it would be helpful to know that there can be some 
leeway in the specification. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In non-monotonic reasoning, we accept certain conclu­
sions as true although we do not know for sure that 
they are. All subsequent reasoning is carried out with 
the assumption that these accepted conclusions are in­
deed true. We argued that the problem of choosing be­
tween multiple extensions in default logic is due to the 
lack of contextual information. The evolving context 
during the course of the reasoning process is important 
in determining the "intuition" behind a default rule. 
This context can be made accessible in a few ways, 
one of which is sequential thresholding, a quantitative 
non-monotonic formalism that is very similar in spirit 
to default logic. Sequential thresholds can be used to 
evaluate the goodness of default extensions by access­
ing how probable each default rule is with respect to 
the continuously evolving context. 
We presented a generic semantic characterization of 
non-monotonic reasoning, as well as the instantia­
tions pertaining to normal default logic and sequen­
tial thresholding. This progressive addition of conclu­
sions to the context, or the progressive restriction of 
admissible sets of possible worlds in (Wi, ... , W1), is 
the crux of non-monotonic reasoning: the conclusions 
of the applied rules are taken as true, and the worlds 
in which these non-deductive conclusions are false are 
eliminated from further consideration. 
We stress here that the rules are not modular, in the 
sense that they are not intended to be specified in a 
way that makes them independent of the rest of the 
rules and facts. On the contrary, the applicability con­
dition cond of a rule depends critically on the current 
context, which is an environment created by the facts 
and the use of other rules. A more rigorous formaliza­
tion of the generic non-monotonic partition sequences 
and further discussion can be found in [Teng, 1997). 
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